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INTRODUCTION
The proposal of a discussion about the use of software to help assign likelihood ratios for forensic
DNA profiling results, and the use of their output in the legal process, is both timely and important
(see also related contributions elsewhere in Frontiers, e.g., Biedermann et al., 2014). Ever since their
introduction in forensic science, DNA profiling analyses have been accompanied with the results
of calculations of various sorts. Their scope is well illustrated and documented in several reference
monographs (e.g., Evett andWeir, 1998; Buckleton et al., 2005; Balding and Steele, 2015). This solid
body of scholarly research and established practice has contributed to the widely held view among
scientists and recipients of expert information that eliciting the probative strength of forensic DNA
profiling results is per se a numerical task.
In this commentary, we intend—in a first part—to make the point that although calculations
are, by virtue, an integral part of the quantification of probative strength, it is equally important
at the outset to be clear about the question “Why are we doing a calculation?” (Buckleton et al.,
2005, p. 151). We will argue that this is not a question that statistics can answer. Stated otherwise,
we will contend that, as much it is important to be clear in any instance about what a particular
computation exactly purports to do, it is essential to define the questions that are of interest in
a particular case at hand. In a second part, we will emphasize on the extent to which, why and
how recently issued guidelines (e.g., ENFSI, 2015) encourage such thinking about cases prior to
conducting calculations, if any.
QUESTIONING DEFAULT CALCULATIONS
Experience demonstrates that many scientists working in operational laboratories decide on the use
of particular computational procedures—often provided by ready-to-use software packages—based
on the mere availability of those procedures at their workplace. This amounts to a convenience
choice, but what is more is that proceeding in this way is considered the best one could do. This
view may be reinforced if the software is based on Bayesian principles, because procedures that
belong to this class of inferential methods are referred to as the most inferentially sound. But the
sole fact that a procedure relies on Bayesian principles does not make it per se pertinent for the case
at hand. As noted by Lindley (2004, p. 74), “[t]hemain danger is that they [Bayesianmethods; added
by the authors] will be used automatically. (. . .) You must think about the real quantities involved,
like temperature or blood pressure, and not about symbols that represent them. This distinction
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between the thinking you and the unthinking, calculating
personal computer is essential.” This danger also exists in
the context of interpreting and reporting forensic DNA
results. Indeed, most of the commonly available computational
procedures1 lead to expressions of probative strength to help
discriminate between so-called sub-source level propositions
[e.g., “the person of interest (POI) is the source of the recovered
DNA” vs. “an unknown person is the source of the recovered
DNA”]. But, in many practical cases, the real question goes
beyond this level, e.g., how the detected DNA got where it
was found (Evett et al., 2002; Taroni et al., 2013), that is so-
called activity level propositions. Cases of alleged rape where the
competing versions only differ with respect to the activities that
led to the trace illustrate this. This is of course not a critique of
models being Bayesian in nature, but of the kind of questions to
which some of these models are tailored.
Skeptics may invoke that none of the above problems are
novel. But why then practice by and large remains unchanged?
While some scientists openly acknowledge that expressions
of probative strength of DNA considering sub-source level
propositions may indeed be insufficient for the needs, some hold
that it is for the Court to decide on that matter. We perfectly
agree with this stance, of course, because whatever the level of the
propositions, it is for the Court to decide on the probability of the
propositions. Notwithstanding, scientists can add considerable
value by assessing their results given activity level propositions.
Yet others contend that one can leave this debate until
the Courtroom. However, this may raise issues from a quality
management point of view, and render the situation very
uncomfortable for the witness, because of the inevitable difficulty
of the task. The challenge is real for a variety of case scenarios, in
particular where only low quantities of DNA are detected and/or
when POIs do not deny that the recovered DNA is theirs. We
seriously doubt that members of the judiciary are able to properly
appreciate the extent to which one can expect to obtain a low
quantity of DNA, recovered at a certain position on the crime
scene, the victim, or a POI, given one activity as compared to
another activity. We would not recommend either doing this
evaluation on the stand. This is because such assessments are
very challenging even for experts, and require scientific knowledge
about many factors, such as transfer, persistence, and the capacity
of a given donor to shed detectable quantities of DNA2. Let
us emphasize again that the question of whether the detected
DNA is that of the POI may be entirely uncontested (and thus
there would be no need for a likelihood ratio given sub-source
propositions as there is no uncertainty about sub-source). What
is really of interest is to assess the probability of observing such
a result for a DNA trace, that is a trace found in a particular
position, in a given quantity and leading to a profile of the
observed quality given the alleged activities and given relevant
1The scope of these procedures is large and includes topics such as complex
modeling of products (e.g., stutters) of the PCR amplification of STRs (e.g., Bright
et al., 2014; Gittelson et al., 2014) and the study of the sensitivity of expressions
of probative value due to the use of particular statistical techniques (e.g., MCMC
techniques, see for example Bright et al., 2015).
2On this topic, see for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/
9115916/The-case-against-DNA.html.
information such as the time lapse between collection of trace
material and the commission of the crime, environmental factors
to which the trace was exposed (e.g., temperature, humidity)
etc. Such assessments are highly case dependent, which calls
for the generation of more research with experiments under
controlled conditions, that can help build a community-wide
knowledge base (Evett, 2015)3. To further emphasize the need for
considering observations given activity level propositions, note
again that the result which is to be assessed is not only the rarity
of genetic features, but also extends to the very fact of finding, at
a given position, a detectable quantity of DNA (Evett and Weir,
1998), which may be nil. Sub-source level propositions cannot
deal with results that did not yield a DNA profile.
The mismatch between default evaluations given sub-source
level propositions and the decision makers’ interest in activity
level propositions is a cause of concern because the strength of
the observations in the former case can be radically different from
that of the latter, so that inappropriate conclusions can result if
the two are taken to be equivalent. We have seen this happen
in cases where scientists report likelihood ratios in the order of
>1020 with propositions at sub-source level when in fact the real
issue was one of activities and where the strength of the findings,
given the conditioning information of the case at hand, was way
more moderate4.
CURRENT RECOMMENDATIONS
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that evaluation
given (sub)-source level propositions is useless or detrimental
in principle5. The point we seek to make is that it is crucial
to assess the needs of the recipient of expert information prior
to choosing a computational procedure. This seems like an
obvious and moderate requirement, yet experience shows that
often it is given little attention in practice. Recent works by
forensic scientists from across Europe, published in the form of
a guideline (ENFSI, 2015), seek both to strengthen awareness of
this issue and help scientists and recipients of expert information
proceed in a more sensible way. For example, in its Guidance
Note 2 on propositions, the document specifies: “Source level
propositions are adequate in cases where there is no risk that the
court will misinterpret them in the context of the alleged activities
in the case” (ENFSI, 2015, p. 12). To illustrate this idea, the
following example is given: “A large fresh bloodstain is recovered
at the point of entry at a burglary scene and delivered to the
laboratory for DNA analysis. Combination of a presumptive test
and appearance allows the scientist to safely assume that the stain
is blood. A suspect says that he has never been in the premises.
The set of propositions can be (1) the bloodstain came from the
defendant and (2) the bloodstain came from another unknown
individual” (ENFSI, 2015, p. 12). In this example, source level
3For an example in other transfer traces, see Buckleton et al. (1989).
4Another issue, not pursued here, is whether likelihood ratios exceeding one
over the earth population, and multiples of that, are reasonable. There is much
argument to say they are not (e.g., Thompson et al., 2003; Hopwood et al., 2012).
5In fact, the strength of the DNA correspondence is so high that this will lead to
situations where the source of the DNA will be admitted (leaving no uncertainty
on the source of the DNA). This, then moves the issue to the activities.
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propositions are not problematic because no expert knowledge is
required regarding phenomena such as transfer and persistence,
as well as background levels of DNA. Such factors do not impact,
in this kind of circumstances, on the understanding of scientific
findings relative to the alleged activities. In particular, it is not
doubted that the bloodstain results from the act of breaking in.
This example also illustrates that there is more to the collected
trace than the DNA profile: there are aspects such as the freshness
of the stain, the quantity of material and the position where the
trace was found. In turn, it is clear that specialized knowledge
regarding transfer, persistence and background would matter in
the above scenario if DNA had been detected in low quantities,
rather than from a rich bloodstain.
The above understanding has far reaching implications: the
level of propositions depends on the factors and observations on
which forensic scientists have expert knowledge. It is their duty
to evaluate all their results so that the Court is not deprived of
information that is necessary for a balanced view. For example,
the ENFSI guideline explicitly advises against the changing
of propositions from activity to (sub-) source level when
relevant expert knowledge is not available: “In fact, the choice
between (sub-) source and activity should not be influenced
by the availability of data or expert knowledge but solely from
the consideration of factors such as transfer, persistence, and
background levels that could crucially affect the strength of the
findings within the context of the case circumstances.” (ENFSI,
2015, p. 13).
We acknowledge, from personal experience, that the
implementation of the above perspective is challenging. It may
be even more so in systems exposed to commercialisation
where forensic providers that conduct DNA profiling analyses
operate more and more separated from those entities that
collected trace material at the crime scene (Jackson, 2013).
Further obstacles may be operational constraints such as time
and costs, because evaluation given activity level propositions
does not rely on default computations, but generally requires a
case-based approach. Regarding the latter point, some scientists
deplore a lack of formulaic developments for evaluation given
propositions at higher hierarchical levels. But this critique
does fall short of the current state of developments. Formal
likelihood ratio approaches exist (e.g., Evett, 1984; Evett and
Weir, 1998), used also for other transfer materials (e.g., glass;
Curran et al., 2000), and there are reports that demonstrate the
relevance and practical feasibility (e.g., McKenna, 2013). Yet,
other developments allow one to account for uncertainty about
the relevance of the recovered material and the possibility that
material was left for innocent reasons (e.g., Evett, 1993; Evett
et al., 2002).
The role of statistics in evaluating DNA profiling evidence
has always been important, but we now must realize that,
increasingly often, the traditional perspective of sub-source
level propositions, and the main focus on the rarity of the
corresponding features (i.e., the so-called conditional genotype
probability), may represent only a first step of the evaluative
process. This does not make these evaluation approaches
wrong, only less comprehensive. The fact is that the extrinsic
characteristics of the trace material (i.e., low quantities of DNA)
and the propositions of interest have changed, and it is important
to realize that this represents the relevant starting point. This
recognition of the needs cannot be answered by statistics, only
the evaluative procedures that need to be built once the needs
are properly elicited. The importance of statistics in this endeavor
remains unaffected, and stands as noted by Lindley (2000, p. 38):
“(. . .) the first task of a statistician is to develop a (probability)
model to embrace the clients’ interests’ and uncertainties. It will
include the data and any parameters that are judged necessary.
Once accomplished, the mechanics of the calculus take over and
the required inference is made.”
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